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Abstract
A large literature investigates the relation between oil and conflict, yet no em-
pirical study has found any link between oil and coups d’e´tat. Using a new data
set on oil production separated into onshore and o↵shore production, and covering
172 countries from 1900 to 2012, onshore oil is seen to promote coup while o↵-
shore oil prevents them. A likely mechanism is that onshore oil motivates military
build-ups, while o↵shore oil does not. From a political leader’s point of view, a large
military is a double-edged sword, because it may turn against him and stage a coup.
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1 Introduction
A striking feature of cross-country coup data is that eight of the ten countries that have
experienced the most coups since 1950 are oil producers, see Figure 1. Furthermore, the
output of seven of these oil producing countries derives largely from onshore oil deposits.
Yet existing studies of oil and political conflict are unable to identify whether oil rents
promote coups. The most recent example is a panel data study by Cotet and Tsui (2013)
who found no robust link between aggregate oil reserves and the occurrence of coups.
In this paper, I analyze whether the location of oil deposits matter for the frequency of
coups. The paper’s key innovation is to employ new global oil data that disentangles oil
production into onshore and o↵shore volumes. This allows me to study the association
between coups and oil’s location in a panel data set of about 130 countries in the period
1950-2008.
After disentangling oil production into onshore and o↵shore volumes, a main finding is
that oil is indeed strongly associated with coups. On the one hand, a one standard
deviation increased onshore oil production almost doubles the coup rate, from one coup
every 20 years to one every eleven years on average. On the other hand, a one standard
deviation increase in o↵shore oil production reduces the coup frequency to once every 23
years on average.
Common to onshore and o↵shore oil is that both provide rents to the government. A
key di↵erence, however, is that onshore oil facilities are di cult to defend, and hence
creates an incentive to build a strong military. First, it is well known that onshore oil
deposits are vulnerable to theft by insurgents (Le Billon, 2001). As a very recent example,
consider the IS terrorist group in Iraq and Syria which exports sizeable volumes of oil
from captured onshore oil fields to fund their operations.1 O↵shore oil fields, on the
other hand, do not seem to o↵er funding opportunities to rebels, the reason being their
location far from land, and the physical characteristics of the oil rigs. While onshore oil
can be loaded on to trucks and transported to black-market customers,2 this is not a
feasible option for o↵shore oil. Second, onshore oil is also susceptible to pure sabotage.
Numerous attacks against onshore oil installations are carried out each year without any
clear motivation other than to voice opposition against the ruling regime. An illustration
of the severity of these attacks is the recent decision by several foreign oil companies to
divest from onshore oilfields in Nigeria, and focus on safer o↵shore oil assets. Oil theft
and sabotage against the onshore sites was cited as the main reasons for reducing onshore
presence.3 Thus, land-based natural resources provide insurgents with an opportunity to
directly voice their grievances through sabotage, or to capture oil revenue through the
illegal appropriation of oil fields. Hence, onshore oil creates incentives to build a strong
military, while o↵shore oil does not.
The existing theoretical literature on natural resources and conflict focuses largely on
civil war (e.g., Aslaksen and Torvik, 2006; van der Ploeg and Rohner, 2012). However,
1Reuters, July 23 2014, ”Oil smuggling finances Islamic State‘s new caliphate”.
2Wall Street Journal, September 16 2014, ”Islamic State Funds push Into Syria and IraqWith Labyrinthine
Oil-Smuggling Operation”.
3Financial Times, May 4 2014, ”Theft and sabotage lead Nigeria into an oil crisis”.
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Figure 1: Top 10 coup countries in period 1950-2008
few contributors analyze coups. One exception is Acemoglu et al. (2010). In their model,
a dictator needs to build a large military in order to stay in power and to avoid a costly
transition to democracy. But a strong military is a double-edged sword; it can be e↵ective
in preventing transition to democracy, but it also creates, as Acemoglu et al. (2010) note
(p. 2) ”a political moral hazard problem because it can turn against the elite and take
direct control of the government”.
To support my argument, I explore the hypothesis that, because regimes in countries rich
with onshore oil have an additional incentive to build a strong military branch, there
is an increased risk the military may be tempted to stage a coup against the regime.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the analysis confirms a link between onshore oil and an
increase in defense spending. A one standard deviation increase in onshore oil production
is associated with about 130 dollars more defense spending per capita. For o↵shore oil
production, however, no significant e↵ect on military spending is found. Moreover, I find
that for the limited period for which military spending data are available, onshore oil
is positively linked to coup likelihood, but only when accompanied by higher military
spending 4
A modest amount of empirical work has been carried out to explore the link between
oil and coups. Svolik (2012) finds no e↵ect of fuel exports as a share of GDP on the
likelihood of coups. The only other rigorous contribution that I am aware of is Cotet and
Tsui (2013), which is closely related to this study. In their work, too, no link is identified
when looking at the e↵ect of aggregate oil reserves on the frequency of coup attempts
once they control for country fixed e↵ects. One possible interpretation of the results in
both Cotet and Tsui(2013) and Svolik (2012) is that the net e↵ect of oil on coups could
be nulled out in an analysis where o↵shore and onshore resources are lumped together
into one single resource wealth measure, be it fuel exports or aggregate oil reserves.
Indeed, using the new oil production data, and aggregating the onshore and o↵shore oil
production variables that I use in this paper into one single variable, my analysis confirms
the findings of Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Svolik (2012).
4See discussion in section 5.3.
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While this paper is about coups, the study fits well with the branch of the resource curse
literature that links oil to conflict (e.g. Collier and Hoe✏er, 2000; Fearon and Laitin,
2003; Ross, 2004; Lujala, 2010). Common to virtually all previous contributions is their
failure to take into account the location of natural resources   or any other sources
of oil heterogeneity for that matter. Only Lujala (2010), studying the outbreak and
persistence of civil wars, has explicitly accounted for the location of oil resources, finding
that only onshore oil is positively linked to civil war. However, the di↵erence between
coups and civil conflict is that violence in civil wars is two-sided, between an insurgent
and a government (Besley and Persson, 2011), and often takes place in remote corners
of a country. In contrast to civil war, coups have their origin within a nation’s state
apparatus. Moreover, Lujala (2010) lacks data on onshore and o↵shore production and
simply relies on a dummy for onshore oil. The current analysis, however, uses information
on oil production volumes at the two di↵erent types of locations.
This paper is also related to the literature on the structural and long-term causes of
coups. Tullock (1974) was the first economist to write about coups, stressing how a
dictator can use rewards and punishments to deter coup plans. Poverty, inequality and
political fractionalization are primary conditions that make societies more coup-prone
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Huntington, 1995; Jackman,
1978; Londregan and Poole, 1990). Coups are particularly common in non-democratic
regimes, but have also occurred in democracies, as well as in transitional regimes (Sutter,
2000; Hiroi and Omori, 2013). This paper contributes to this literature by adding the
location of natural resources as a predictor of coup attempts.
Moreover, I also improve the methodological approach of previous work. In Cotet and
Tsui (2013), fixed e↵ects are included in the estimation but time fixed e↵ects are not
properly accounted for. Since annual coups in the world have trended downwards since
the 1960s, this warrants the inclusion of a common time trend in the analysis. Addition-
ally, OLS can be inappropriate for count data since it can predict negative counts and
might yield ine cient estimators. Hence, this study uses a fixed e↵ects negative binomial
regression, which is better suited for discrete counts such as coups (King, 1988).
Lastly, the paper relates to the broader literature on the e↵ect of political instability on
economic performance. In this literature, Alesina et al. (1996) documents the adverse
e↵ects of political instability, of which coups is a main source of variation, on economic
growth - a finding that has been confirmed also by others (e.g., Aisen and Veiga, 2013).
I advance this literature by identifying how political instability can be traced back to the
location of natural resources.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 covers the data and coup definition as well as a
describing the oil data set. Section 3 outlines the empirical estimation framework, while
section 4 provides the main results from the estimations. Section 5 discusses possible
mechanisms, including the hypothesis that onshore petroleum resources are associated
with higher military spending. Section 5 also discusses and tests the hypothesis that
o↵shore oil is associated with more intercepted coup plots and arrests of coup-makers
than onshore oil. In addition, section 5 discusses potential concerns for this paper’s main
result. Section 6 concludes.
4
2 Data and definition
2.1 Coup data
The main dependent variable in this paper is the number of observed coup attempts,
successful or not, in country i at time t.5 Hence, the data covers both successful and
failed coup attempts. Success is defined as coup events where coup-makers were able
to hold on to power for at least seven days. The coup data were compiled by Powell
and Thyne (2011), and covers the period 1950 to 2008 for a sample of 192 countries.
Coup is defined as ”Illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the
state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive”. Essential to a coup attempt is the
control of all or part of the armed forces or other military elements. Unlike a revolution,
which is usually achieved by large numbers of people seeking basic political and economic
change, a coup is a change in power from the top that results in the abrupt replacement
of the ruling elite. As such, a coup rarely changes a nations fundamental social and
economic policies (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). For my purposes, a coup attempt is
an observable measure of political instability.
Coups are the most prevalent form of non-democratic regime change in the world, more
common than regular elections in some nations (Sutter, 2000). The total number of coup
attempts in the data set is 450, and the total number of observations is 8517, so the
unconditional probability of experiencing a coup attempt is .053. Hence, on average, a
coup occurs every 20 years. In this paper, this is referred to as the mean coup rate. The
corresponding mean success rate is 48 percent during the entire time span. Geograph-
ically, almost three quarters of these coup attempts have been observed in Africa and
Latin America, with 41 percent in Africa and 31 percent in Latin America. Historically,
coups are about 4.5 times more likely to occur in any given year in a country below
the mean democracy level than in a country that has above mean institutional quality.6
Figure 2 shows that the number of annual coup events worldwide has declined since the
1960s, when coup attempts were particularly rife.
Other datasets on coups are available, most importantly Marshall and Marshall’s (2007),
who in addition to overt coup attempts also include ’unobserved’ coup attempts, such as
coup plots and alleged coup plots. Hence, this data set includes more coup observations,
a total of 716 coup attempts. However, the measurement error associated with coup plots
and alleged coup plots is likely to be substantial, and governments often have an incen-
tive to fabricate coup plots and rumors to justify repression (Powell and Thyne, 2011).
Nevertheless, I run separate regressions also for this data set. In addition, I construct a
new variable where only the plots and alleged plots are counted. This generates a variable
with 337 observed coup plots and alleged coup plots that can be analyzed separately.7
5Throughout, coup d’etat will be referred to simply as ”coup”.
6The total number of country-years where at least one coup occurred in the non-democratic sample
throughout the period is 305, while 80 country-years experienced at least one coup in the above-average
democratic countries in this period.
7See section 5.2
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Figure 2: Annual coups in the world, 1950-2008
2.2 Oil data
The global oil production series decomposed into onshore and o↵shore sources is provided
by Rystad Energy’s UCube database (2013). Rystad is an independent oil and gas
consulting services company headquartered in Oslo, Norway. They in turn have collected
the production data from oil and gas companies’ annual reports as well as authorities’
historical production accounts. Based on this data, I construct the variables for yearly
onshore and o↵shore production, measured in barrels per capita for each country-year.
Historically, the volume of onshore oil production is higher than o↵shore oil production,
and today o↵shore volumes are about half the volume from onshore sources.8 Also, the
timing is di↵erent. The first oil well ever drilled was at an onshore oil field in Pennsylvania
in 1859, while the first o↵shore oil well was drilled o↵ the coast of California in 1896. It
was not until the 1960s and 1970s that output from o↵shore oil fields reached significant
levels, relative to the volumes from onshore sources. Perhaps surprisingly, countries below
the mean democracy level have an eleven times higher average accumulated o↵shore oil
production than their democratic counterparts, and similarly for onshore oil. These
figures relate to a sample period from 1929 to 2008. This suggests that, with the aid
of foreign oil majors, weakly institutionalized countries have been able to develop both
o↵shore and onshore oil reserves. An illustration of this is Chevrons presence in Venezuela
since the 1920s, or Royal Dutch Shell’s operations in Nigeria since 1937. The variability
of the two production series is similar, and the coe cient of within variation is 4.58 for
o↵shore oil production per capita, and 4.33 for onshore oil production per capita.
Many empirical studies of the economic and political impact of oil uses oil reserves rather
than production volumes as their principal source of resource variation, yet there are
at least three advantages to focusing on production volumes rather than reserves in
the current setting. First, the production figures vary more over time than estimates
8 See Figure A4 in the appendix for a graphical display of historical onshore and o↵shore oil production
measured in thousand barrels per day.
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of reserves, so there is more within-country variation to exploit in the data. Second,
production data are largely reported by international oil companies in their annual reports
to investors, and are therefore more accurate than reserve data. A country’s reserve
figures are often reported by the governmental bodies in each country, and these bodies
have sometimes other reasons for reporting a certain reserve figure. It is believed that
OPEC countries overstate reserves in order to be able to produce more crude oil than
their quota allows (Lux research, 2012). Since OPEC regulations only enable member
countries to produce a certain fraction of total reserves, each member can boost its
production quota by overstating the reserves. Reserves can also be overstated for other
reasons, political or to attract investment. Third, estimated oil reserve figures are, even in
the most developed oil-rich countries, associated with significant geological uncertainty,
and should always be interpreted with caution. Moreover, according to Torvik (2013),
using oil reserves as a measure of resource abundance is likely to introduce biases that
portray oil as having favorable e↵ects on institutions since well-functioning countries that
have discovered more of their petroleum reserves will be measured as resource abundant.
2.3 Other controls
In addition to the main variables reviewed above, I also add a range of control variables
that are assumed to explain variation in coup events. The following determinants of coups
are used: log of GDP; economic growth; log of population; Polity IV democracy index
from the Center for Systemic Peace; crude oil price in constant 1990 dollars; oil discoveries
measured in million barrels per 1000 persons from the Association for the Study of Peak
Oil and Gas (ASPO);9 and a dummy for ongoing civil war from Gleditsch Correlates of
War, version 1.52. In the fixed e↵ects specifications, only relevant time-varying variables
are included. The military spending variable that I use to explore the potential link
between onshore oil, the military and coups is from the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), and covers the years 1989-2003 and 156 countries. The vari-
able measures military spending as percentage of GDP. For our purposes, this variable is
transformed into military expenditure in constant US dollars per capita. Average spend-
ing on military per capita is 184 US dollars. Unfortunately, extensive military spending
data are not available before 1989. However, as a robustness check, military spending
will be included in the coup estimation.10 See the appendix for summary statistics of all
relevant variables.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Main analysis of oil and coups
The coup variable analyzed is a standard count variable, representing the number of
coup attempts for country i at time t. A useful approximation to the underlying data
9The ASPO data and most of the controls are from Cotet and Tsui (2013).
10See table A5 in the appendix and comments in section 5.3.
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generating process for an event count is usually taken to be a Poisson distribution, a
distribution that is discrete and is restricted to positive values. King (1988) lists several
problems associated with using OLS models on event count data. First, OLS assumes
a linear relationship. Imposing a linear relation often results in predicting event counts
that are less than zero and therefore meaningless. Second, OLS introduces ine ciencies
in the estimates because it does not take into account the underlying Poisson distribution
of the disturbances. According to King, the result can be that OLS estimators get both
the sign and size wrong.
To avoid this source of impreciseness in the estimates, I use a negative binomial regression
with fixed e↵ects, as proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (1998).11 Because of overdisper-
sion in the distribution of coups, the negative binomial regression model fits better than
the pure Poisson specification. The negative binomial distribution can be regarded as
a generalization of the Poisson distribution with an additional parameter allowing the
variance to exceed the mean. In our case the mean of the coup variable is 0.053 and the
variance is 0.261. The empirical model to be estimated then reads:12
Coupsi,t = exp( Xi,t +  t +  i + "i,t), (1)
where the vector  Xi,t is a battery of time-varying control variables that are assumed to
be related to the occurrence of coups,  t is the time-fixed e↵ects,  i is the country-fixed
e↵ects and "i,t is an error term which is clustered at the country level. Coupsi,t is the
predicted number of coups, restricted to be a positive integer. Adding country fixed e↵ects
allows the model to control for any time-invariant unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
The omitted variable bias arising from the exclusion of any stable confounding factors
on the country level, is thus removed completely from the estimation. In our setting,
time-invariant country-characteristics that may be important to control for, are factors
like political culture and norms as well as historically predetermined conditions such as,
e.g., colonial past, geographic traits and social structures that have been relatively stable
over the time span. The time fixed e↵ects are mainly included to control for a common
time trend in the evolution of coups. From Figure 2, showing the annual number of coups
globally since 1950, it is clearly necessary to control for time trends, since the number of
coups seem to have declined more or less steadily since the early 1960s.
3.2 Military spending analysis
Military spending is a persistent time-series for most countries (Goldsmith, 2003). That
being the case, it is natural to consider a dynamic model specification. The estimation of
military spending is therefore based on a fixed e↵ects OLS and a dynamic GMM model.
OLS regressions with lagged levels of military spending would yield an estimator upwards
11An early application of count regression in a panel data setting is found in Hausman et al. (1984), in a
study of patents.
12With a slight abuse of notation.
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biased and inconsistent, since the lagged level of military spending is correlated with the
error term. The fixed e↵ects within-transformation do not solve the problem because of
the possible Nickel bias (Nickel, 1981).
As a baseline estimation, I estimate an OLS regression without including the lagged
level of military spending included as a covariate. In this first regression, I use the within
estimator to control for country fixed e↵ects, and in addition add year dummies to control
for any common time trend.
I then compare the results of the OLS model with a GMM model. As shown by Blundell
and Bond (1997), when the coe cient on the lagged dependent variable approaches unity,
so that the dependent variable is close to a random walk, the di↵erenced GMM (Arel-
lano and Bond, 1991) has poor finite sample properties, and will be downward biased.
Therefore, the System GMM estimator is more suitable, as proposed by Blundell and
Bond (1997). In dynamic panel settings, the system GMM approach is found to perform
better than the di↵erence GMM model when series are persistent (coe cient on lagged
dependent variable is close to unity), and there is a reduction in the finite sample bias
due to the exploitation of additional moment conditions (Blundell et al. 2000).
In our case, the coe cient on lagged military spending is 0.96, suggesting that the system
GMM model performs better than a di↵erence GMM model. The GMM approach is the
most suitable for situations where one has a small T, large N. In our case T is 15 and N
is 121. To avoid the issue of too many instruments, I restrict the number of lags to three.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
The baseline results in the following section refer to the estimation of model 1, where the
dependent variable is the number of coups; the results are displayed in table 1. Column
1 shows the estimation where aggregate oil production in barrels per capita is the main
covariate of interest. Country and year fixed e↵ects are included in all the estimations.
The total oil production coe cient is insignificant as an explanatory variable for coup
attempts, confirming Cotet and Tsui (2013) who find no e↵ect of aggregate oil reserves
in thousand barrels per capita on the number of coup attempts. As expected, democratic
level, income and economic growth are negatively associated with coups. This confirms
earlier studies of the structural causes of coups. 13
In column 2, the only change from column 1 is that the aggregate oil production is dis-
entangled into onshore and o↵shore production volumes. Importantly, this yields highly
significant coe cients, but with opposite signs. Onshore oil shows a strong positive link
with the rate of coups. For the o↵shore oil coe cient, the reverse is true: there is a
strong negative association with the rate of coups. In a negative binomial regression, the
interpretation of the coe cients requires that one takes the exponential of each coe -
cient. Doing so yields the following results: A one standard deviation increase in onshore
13See literature discussion in the introduction.
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oil production per capita is associated with an average increase in the coup rate that
corresponds to moving from one coup attempt every 20 years to one every 11 years. For
o↵shore oil, a one standard deviation increase in o↵shore oil production per capita is
associated with an average decrease in the coup rate that corresponds to moving from
one coup attempt every 20 years to one every 23 years.
In column 3, other relevant controls are added. An ongoing civil war could likely lead
to instability also at the political level, resulting in coup attempts. Therefore, a dummy
for years during which a country had an ongoing civil war is added. Also, expectations
of future oil revenues could spur coup plotters to attempt a coup. Oil discoveries are
therefore added as a control, a variable that measures the size of oil discoveries per
country per year. Lastly, a lagged coup variable is added, in order to check for any
persistence in the rate of coup attempts. The dummy for ongoing civil war is positively
and significantly linked to a higher coup rate. Coups are more rife in the turmoil of a
civil war than in peacetime. Oil discovery does not seem to a↵ect the coup rate. The
lagged level of coup attempts is significant and positive. This indicates that there is some
’coup persistence’, or that one coup attempt increases the likelihood of another at a later
date. Importantly, however, the estimates on onshore and o↵shore production remain
statistically significant and stable in size throughout.
As mentioned, coups are more than four times as likely to occur in a given year in a non-
democratic country than in a democratic country. This warrants a separate estimation on
the non-democratic sample. The results from a regression on the sample of countries that
are below the mean level of democracy is shown in column 4. The coe cient on o↵shore
oil actually gains in magnitude from 0.008 to 0.01 and the onshore coe cient becomes
slightly smaller. However, both the onshore and o↵shore oil production coe cients are
still significant at the 1 percent level and 0.1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1: Fixed e↵ects negative binomial regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
Total Oil production per. capita 0.0015
(1.03)
Onshore oil production per. capita 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤
(6.96) (5.5) (4.77)
O↵shore oil production per. capita -0.009⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤
(-3.17) (-2.95) (-3.06 )
log of GDP -101.01⇤⇤ -110.96⇤⇤ -88.10⇤⇤ -68.56⇤
(-3.16) (-3.42) (-2.91) (-2.09)
Economic growth -3.47⇤⇤ -3.42⇤⇤ -2.58⇤⇤ -2.13⇤
(-3.24) (-3.31) (-2.76) (-2.02)
log of population -132.39 -170.14⇤ -185.33⇤ -308.65⇤⇤
(-1.55) (-2.66) (-2.04) (-2.58)
Democracy index -85.60⇤ -90.18⇤⇤ -98.22⇤⇤ 138.34⇤
(-2.56) (-2.66) (-3.09) (2.19)
Crude oil price .061 .12⇤
(1.17) (2.08)
Ongoing civil war .857⇤⇤ 0.72⇤
(2.86) (2.10)
Oil discovery -.303 -1.25
(-.73) (-1.88)
Lag of No of Coup attempts .275⇤⇤ .21
(3.30) (1.80)
Constant 14.71 18.73⇤ -1.689 5.68
(1.77) (2.28) (-.28) (.78)
N 6080 6080 4209 2390
Countries 128 128 99 74
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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4.2 Robustness
In order to make the results from the first regressions more robust, I estimate several
alternative models. First, one robustness exercise is to check if the main results hold
for a di↵erent set of coup data, namely Marshall and Marshall’s (2011). The results
from this estimation are found in table A6 in the appendix. Column 1 substantiates
the main finding from Cotet and Tsui (2013). Aggregate oil production is insignificant
as a covariate for coup attempts. Column 2 confirms that decomposing the total oil
production into onshore and o↵shore volumes, yields significant results. Onshore oil is
positively associated with coups, but this time, the o↵shore oil coe cient is statistically
insignificant at the conventional levels. However, when additional controls are included, in
column 3, the results from table 1 are reconfirmed. The coe cients are remarkably similar
to the ones estimated in table 1, and onshore oil production per capita is significant at the
0.1 percent level and o↵shore oil production per. capita at the 5 percent level. In the last
column, the regression is estimated only on the non-democratic sub-sample of countries.
For this sample, the onshore oil coe cient remains stable and has an even higher t-value
than in the full sample regression. The o↵shore oil coe cient is still significant at the 5
percent level.
Second, since the production time series are non-stationary for most countries, an alter-
native model specification is to estimate all variables in first-di↵erences with Ordinary
Least Squares. This addresses potential spurious regression problems, while at the same
time taking into account any country fixed e↵ects. In addition, it checks if results are
confirmed also when using a linear model such as Ordinary Least Squares. However,
since it is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares and not a negative binomial regression, I
expect the coe cients to be less e ciently estimated.14 The results are found in table A7,
where the regressions from table 1 are repeated, this time on the Powell and Thyne (2011)
coup data. Column 1 shows the regression with the aggregate oil production per capita,
which is still statistically insignificant. Column 2 shows the decomposed oil production
coe cients, and again onshore and o↵shore oil have opposite signs and are significant,
now at the 5 and 0.1 percent level, respectively. Adding more controls in column 3 does
not change the results.
Third, I check whether the main results hold across di↵erent model specifications. Table
A8 shows the results of a fixed e↵ects logistic regression. First, both the available coup
variables are transformed into two di↵erent dummy variables, equal to one if there were
one or more coup attempts in a year, and zero if not. The results are confirmed also in
this framework. The results for the Powell and Thyne (2011) data set are summarized in
column 1 and 2, while column 3 reiterates the estimation for the Marshall and Marshall
(2011) data set. Lastly, column 4 restricts the sample to non-democratic countries.
Fourth, table A9 shows the the baseline results from table 1 using a negative binomial
fixed e↵ects regression, but only regressing on the sample of countries that have ex-
perienced at least one coup attempt since 1950. The results are robust also for this
coup-sample of countries.
14See discussion on count models in section 3.
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Fifth, an implicit assumption so far is that a production increase one year leads immedi-
ately to a higher coup rate. But coup attempts presumably require some planning, and
can not always be initiated immediately. Therefore, all explanatory variables are trans-
formed into five-year changes and lagged one period so that they describe the past five
years change in, e.g., onshore and o↵shore oil production before a coup attempt occurs.
Table A10 shows the results, where the coe cient on onshore oil production per capita
stays stable. This suggests a build-up period in onshore oil production before the military
attempts a coup. The negative link between o↵shore oil and coup, however, disappears if
I use a five year change in o↵shore oil production as a covariate, something which suggests
that the link between o↵shore oil and less coups is more short-term in terms of timing.
A dictator may be able to respond more quickly to possible coup threats and intercept
them, even when o↵shore oil extraction has not been in place for a long period.
Lastly, another robustness check is to remove extreme cases. Therefore, a regression
without the identified countries that have experienced the highest number of coups in a
single year are excluded from the estimation. The results from this exercise are shown in
table A11, and once again the coe cients remain stable.
5 Discussion of mechanisms
5.1 Onshore oil and military spending
Why do o↵shore and onshore oil have opposite signs in the regressions predicting coup
attempts? Roughly 3 out of 4 coups originate in the military (Oberg et al., 2011).
Hence, any mechanism that aims to explain variation in coup attempts should include the
military. To reiterate my hypothesis, if a dictator wants to secure the rents from onshore
oil, he needs to build a strong army to protect oil fields from rebels and insurgents.
However, based on the model in Acemoglu et al. (2010), a strong military may turn
against the dictator and stage a coup. Another model proposing this mechanism is
Besley and Robinson (2010), whose theory of military coups emphasizes a dictator’s
need to control the military. In their model, only a large military poses a coup threat,
contrary to a ”tin pot” military which is too weak to stage a coup. For the data to support
this proposed mechanism, onshore oil must be associated with higher average levels of
military spending. Moreover, onshore and o↵shore oil must have di↵erent impacts on
defense spending.
Perlo-Freeman et al. (2012) describe several ways in which natural resources can lead to a
build-up in military expenditure. First, since oil rents are a source of income independent
of taxation of citizens, such revenues are often more easily used for arms purchases than
money from ordinary taxpayers. Second, defense spending can be increased in order to
protect oil infrastructure from attacks. Third, a regime whose hold on power depends
critically on resource revenue, may spend more on the military as a guarantor of regime
survival.
Existing empirical evidence suggests that authoritarian regimes spend more on defense
than democratic regimes (Hewitt, 1992; Goldsmith, 2003). Furthermore, Cotet and Tsui
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Figure 3: More onshore production, heavier defense burden
Note: The figure is a margins plot with 95 percent CI. The vertical axis measures the
log of mean military spending in USD per capita while the horizontal axis shows the
sample divided into quartiles from 1-4 according to their onshore production level.
(2013) find that in non-democratic countries, oil discoveries are associated with increased
military spending. Ali et al. (2013), studying military spending patterns in the Middle
East and North Africa, find that abundance of oil leads to increased military spending.
Could the link between oil and defense spending be attributable to onshore oil? Broad
patterns in the raw data do indeed seem to suggest a closer link between onshore oil and
military spending. The unconditional correlation between onshore production per capita
and military spending level per capita is .52, while it is .21 for o↵shore oil. Figure 3 tells
a similar story. The countries in higher quartiles of onshore oil production also has higher
average military spending level.
Table 2 shows the regression results for military spending. Column 1 shows the OLS
fixed e↵ects baseline regression. The coe cient on onshore oil production per capita is
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. One standard deviation increase in onshore
oil production per capita is associated with an 800 dollars increase in military spending
per capita. As expected, there is no significant e↵ect on military spending from o↵shore
oil production.
However, as the military spending time series shows strong persistence, this calls for the
inclusion of lagged military spending in the regression. Column 2 reports the results
from the dynamic panel system GMM approach. The lagged level of military spending
is strongly significant. The coe cient on onshore oil is positive and significant at the 5
percent level, but has diminished in magnitude. Now, taking into account the persistence
of military spending, a one standard deviation increase in onshore oil production is asso-
ciated with 133 dollars more in defense spending per capita. The coe cient on o↵shore
oil production per capita is still insignificant.
Column 3 shows the results from the estimation on the sample of countries below the
mean level of institutional quality. As one would expect, the coe cient on onshore
oil production per capita is larger in magnitude when estimation is restricted to non-
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democratic countries, and it is still significant at the 5 percent level. The results confirm
the findings on military spending in Cotet and Tsui (2013). However, my results indicate
that the relation between oil and defense spending is driven solely by onshore oil. A
one standard deviation increase in onshore oil production increases military spending
by 257 dollars per capita. The coe cient on o↵shore oil production is still statistically
insignificant.
The last column is again a regression on the whole sample of countries, but with added
controls for the price of crude oil and for ongoing civil conflict, both of which show no
significant link to military spending. Rather, the coe cient on onshore oil becomes even
more significant, now at the 0.1 percent level. Moreover, the coe cient returns to the
level from the second estimation. A one standard deviation onshore oil production is
associated with 72 dollars more military spending per capita on average. Also GDP per
capita is strongly significant in this estimation.
The standard post-estimation routine after system GMM regressions is to perform a
Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in the first-di↵erenced errors. Because the first
di↵erence of independently and identically distributed idiosyncratic errors will be serially
correlated, rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-di↵erenced
errors at order one does not imply that the model is misspecified. Rejecting the null
at higher orders implies that the moment conditions are not valid. For our case, the
test is reassuring, and we can reject the null of no serial correlation of order one in the
first-di↵erenced errors at the 5 percent level. For second order serial correlation, we can
not reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, it seems that the moment conditions are valid
in our case.
A note of caution with regard to these results: the sample period for military spending
data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) starts in 1989, when
coup activity already had decreased substantially.15 However, one feasible robustness
exercise is to check whether the risk of coup from having onshore oil depends on military
spending for this sample period. Table A5, column 1, shows the results of a regression
where onshore oil production is interacted with military spending. The coe cient of the
interacted variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, while the original
onshore oil coe cient is insignificant. The results suggest that in this period, an increase
in onshore oil production is positively linked to coup, but only when accompanied by
more military spending.
15A fifth of the total number of coups in the data occurred after 1989.
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Table 2: Fixed e↵ects OLS and System GMM estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: Military spending per capita
Onshore oil production per capita 4.05⇤⇤ 0.670⇤ 1.314⇤ 0.67⇤⇤⇤
(3.16) (2.38) (2.49) (7.09)
O↵shore oil production per capita 0.59 0.0017 -0.322 0.005
(0.82) (0.00) (-0.90) (0.03)
log of GDP 4637.47⇤ 5599.8 1087.5 5589.4⇤⇤⇤
(1.96) (1.20) (0.19) (8.23)
log of population -7225.24 744.3 -2980.1 714.3
(-0.85) (0.21) (-0.67) (0.62)
Democracy index -103.12 1120.4 1702.3 1165.3
(-0.05) (1.05) (0.12) (1.63)
Lag of military spending 0.832⇤⇤⇤ 0.775⇤⇤⇤ 0.832⇤⇤⇤
(23.25) (13.74) (58.05)
Ongoing civil war 1.733
(0.46)
Crude oil price 0.005
(0.13)
Constant 313.55 -514.4⇤⇤ 207.7 -511.0⇤⇤⇤
(0.45) (-2.87) (0.30) (-3.59)
N 1660 1524 551 1524
Countries 121 120 66 120
FE C/Y GMM GMM GMM
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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16A strong outlier in the military spending sample is Kuwait. Since 1989, the unconditional correlation
between onshore oil production and military spending in Kuwait is -.91, and getting interpretable results
from the estimations requires the removal of Kuwait as an identified outlier. Since the military spending
variable time period starts in 1989, and Saddam Husseins Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, oil production and
military spending in Kuwait follows a special pattern. In 1990, due to the land invasion by Iraqi forces,
production from Kuwait’s onshore wells that year dropped to historically unprecedented levels. The
same year, Kuwaiti defense spending rose to equally unprecedented levels, and more than quadrupled.
For these reasons, Kuwait is removed from the estimations.
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5.2 O↵shore oil and coup prevention
The previous section showed that the available data for military spending strongly indi-
cate a positive relation between onshore oil and military spending. But why is o↵shore
oil negatively associated with coups? In order to address this, I explore the coup dataset
compiled by Marshall and Marshall (2011). It is as extensive as the one used in the main
analysis, namely Powell and Thyne’s (2011), but the two di↵er on one important point.
Powell and Thyne’s data contain a total of 450 observed coup attempts, successful and
failed. Marshall and Marshall’s (2011) contains 716 observations of coup attempts. The
main reason for this di↵erence is that the latter in addition to observed coup attempts
count coup plots and alleged coup plots. Reports of coup plots and alleged coup plots are
found in various news sources, and are of course of questionable quality compared to the
observed coup attempts. These events are mainly news stories of arrested ’coup-plotters’
and stopped coup plans. Common to all these events is that the alleged coups were
stopped before they could be carried out.
Thus, the coup plots and alleged coup plots can be viewed as a signal of a dictator’s
ability to curb coup plots before plans are set into motion. O↵shore oil extraction creates
a relatively weaker incentive for a dictator to build a large military in order to secure the
rents, since protecting the o↵shore oil facilities is relatively less demanding than onshore
oil fields. Consistent with this, no significant link between o↵shore oil and military
spending was found. A smaller army potentially poses less of a coup threat than a large
one. This is in line with the theoretical mechanisms in both Acemoglu et al. (2010) and
Besley and Robinson (2010), all of whom emphasize that a weaker military poses less of
a coup threat. If the hypothesis is to be backed by the data, it must produce a positive
and significant sign on the o↵shore oil coe cient for coups that were ’prevented’, and a
weaker, or no, e↵ect of having more onshore oil production.
The plots and alleged plots are identified by the following simple transformation:
PreventedCoupsi,t = TotalCoupsi,t  ObservedCoupsi,t, (2)
where TotalCoups is the sum of observed coup attempts, coup plots and alleged coup
plots, as defined by Marshall and Marshall (2011) and ObservedCoups are only the ob-
served coup attempts as defined by Powell and Thyne (2011). The transformation pro-
duces a variable that counts only the coup plots and alleged coup plots. These events
are referred to here as prevented coups. The next step is to regress the prevented coups
on the same covariates as the observed coup attempts, and look for di↵erences in the
coe cients.
The results from the regressions are shown in table 3. The first column shows the estima-
tion with aggregate oil production as the main coe cient of interest. As it is significant at
the 5 percent level, prevented coups seem to be linked positively to total oil production.
However, once oil production is disaggregated into onshore and o↵shore oil production, in
column 2, the heterogeneous e↵ects of o↵shore and onshore oil reappear. A one standard
deviation increase in o↵shore oil production per capita means that a coup plot is revealed
every 20 years, compared to every 25 years which is the unconditional mean rate of
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prevented coups. Therefore, these results suggest that, while onshore oil is robustly
linked to a higher number of observed coup attempts, o↵shore oil is strongly linked to
prevented coups. Does more o↵shore oil and the absence of a large military make it easier
for the dictator to halt coup attempts before they are carried out? These results suggests
that it does.
Column 3 shows the estimation results when additional relevant controls are added: the
o↵shore coe cient grows in magnitude and significance. Since coups are most prevalent in
non-democratic regimes, the last estimation, displayed in column 4, restricts the sample
to countries below average in institutional quality. The coe cient on o↵shore oil gains
both in size and in significance for the sample of non-democratic countries.
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Table 3: Fixed e↵ects negative binomial regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: Prevented coups
Total oil production per capita 0.0107⇤
(2.16)
Onshore oil production per capita 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.91) (0.74) (0.83)
O↵shore oil production per capita 0.014⇤⇤ 0.019⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
(2.88) (4.55) (3.98)
Log of GDP -97.52⇤⇤⇤ -99.15⇤⇤⇤ -104.38⇤⇤⇤ -116.66⇤⇤
(-3.31) (-3.38) (-3.28) (-2.82)
Economic growth -1.304 -1.279 -0.91 -0.274
(-1.11) (-1.10) (-0.85) (-0.28)
Log of population -90.12 -92.89 -126.28 -218.26
(-1.51) (-1.56) (-1.99) (-1.88)
Democracy index -68.93 -67.56 -59.82 -55.22
(-1.73) (-1.67) (-1.50) (-0.55)
Ongoing civil war 0.36 -0.41
(1.54) (-1.46)
Crude oil price 0.28 0.31⇤
(-) (2.30)
Constant -4.922 -4.835 -8.30 -0.86
(-1.89) (.) (.) (. )
N 6080 6080 5702 3135
Countries 128 128 128 94
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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5.3 Possible concerns
A first potential concern would be that my results are due to omitted unobserved cross-
country heterogeneity. For example, being a well-functioning or poorly-functioning coun-
try is a relatively stable feature of a country that could give rise to an omitted variable
bias. The inclusion of country fixed e↵ects confronts this issue head on, since it removes
any bias that is due to omitted confounding factors at the country level. Also, the tech-
nique removes all stable country characteristics that may be correlated with onshore and
o↵shore oil exploration and production, income, institutional level or any other variable
that is included in the estimation.
A second potential concern is the joint evolution of institutions and education levels
within countries over time, consistent with Seymor Martin Lipset’s (1959) modernization
theory, implying that countries evolving in such a way may experience less coups. First,
this would be a within-country long-term trend, as institutions and education levels do
not change over night. The same applies to the development of oil reserves, which can take
several decades in the case of o↵shore reserves. The statistical inference in this paper is
based on yearly frequency production data for onshore and o↵shore oil and coups. Thus,
the long-term trend described above would have to influence very short-term fluctuations
in oil production in order to a↵ect results, which is unlikely. Second, the regressions
explicitly include institutional quality, economic growth and income level as time-varying
covariates. So, indeed, if a country’s institutional quality improves, the mentioned co-
variates should make sure that the o↵shore or onshore oil production variables are not
acting as a proxy for any of them.
To the extent that coups are linked to measures of institutional quality, one possible
critique is that countries with relatively better institutional standards on the margin drill
more exploratory wells than their neighbouring countries (Cust and Harding, 2014). A
wide interpretation of this result would be that higher institutional quality, i.e. fewer
coups, would lead to more oil production in the long-run. Again, such a long-term
concern is unlikely to a↵ect production cycles in the short-term. Nevertheless, assuming
the caveat is relevant for the results, it would, if anything, introduce a downward bias on
both onshore and o↵shore oil production coe cients. If this were the case, it would only
add to the credibility of the positive sign of the onshore oil coe cient.
A fourth possible concern is the alternative mechanism that, in a coup-year, a dictator
in control of onshore oil assets foresees a coup originating in the military, and boosts
production levels in order to extract all he can from the rent before he is ousted. This
could also give a short-term e↵ect of onshore oil production on coups, but for di↵erent
reasons than those outlined in this paper. Table A12 in the appendix directly confronts
this alternative story, as it reiterates the estimation from table 1, but with lagged oil
production. For this story to be valid, using lagged levels of the oil production variables
to explain coup should produce an insignificant coe cient for onshore oil production, since
dictators are unlikely to systematically foresee coups two years ahead. The coe cients,
however, stay significant and robust also for this exercise. Table A10 also addresses this
issue, because all variables are estimated in 5-year changes. The onshore oil coe cient is
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still significant, suggesting that this is not a relevant caveat for this papers results.17
Nevertheless, I estimate two additional regressions to address possible issues of reverse
causality and/or omitted variable bias. First, in the first-di↵erences estimation of the
baseline regression, the last column adds country and year fixed e↵ects. The purpose of
adding country fixed e↵ects to a first-di↵erences estimation is to control for any possible
country-specific long or short-term trends that may a↵ect coup frequency, institutional
level, exploration activity or other time-varying covariates. The coe cients on onshore
and o↵shore oil production per capita remain statistically significant also in this setting.
The purpose of adding year fixed e↵ects is to control for any aggregate year shocks that
may impact the change in coup frequency, income levels, institutional quality and oil
exploration. The latter could be the introduction of a new exploration technology in a
given year that shifts the level of drilling on a global scale. Both coe cients for onshore
and o↵shore oil gain in magnitude when estimating this model.
The second strategy to confront the possible critique of omitted institutional variables
is to add two interaction terms to the baseline regression, the democracy index variable
interacted with both onshore and o↵shore oil production. The reason why this addresses
the critique is that if results were driven solely by countries’ institutional quality, the
original o↵shore oil production coe cient should be rendered insignificant, while o↵shore
oil production interacted with institutional quality should be negative and significant.
This is not the case. Also, the interaction between onshore oil production and institutional
quality is insignificant, while the original coe cient remains as before. The results are
reported in table A5, column 2. Column 3 shows the same results, only restricted to non-
democratic countries (with a democracy score below the mean score). The last column
in table A5 adds further controls to robustify the coe cients of interest.
6 Concluding remarks
A striking pattern in the data is that out of the ten countries that have experienced the
most coups in the world, as many as eight produced significant amounts of oil. Yet, the
literature has never established any link between oil and coups.
This paper’s main contribution is to show that aggregate data on oil production contain
valuable information of relevance for the prevalence of coups. However, this information is
not utilized unless oil production is disentangled according to the location of oil extraction.
The reason is that onshore and o↵shore oil operations di↵er in ways that matter for
political incentives.
The study shows a positive link between onshore oil and military spending, while no
significant coe cient is found for o↵shore oil production per capita. The hypothesized
mechanism is that frequent attacks against onshore oil facilities makes it necessary for
dictators to build a large military, in order to protect oil fields from attacks. But a large
military can also spin out of control, turn against the ruling elite, and stage a coup.
17Importantly, the statistical significance of the oil coe cients disappear after five years, indicating that
results are not driven by long-term within-country trends.
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An open question, then, is why there is a negative relation between o↵shore oil and coups.
Exploring the details of the coup data, it turns out that o↵shore oil is positively related to
revealed coup plots, i.e., coups that never materialized as observed coup attempts. The
proposed mechanism is that since o↵shore oil is not linked to a build-up of the armed
forces, the military poses less of a coup threat. However, the two potential mechanisms
for the established heterogeneous correlations between o↵shore and onshore oil and coups
that have been suggested and briefly explored, are by no means exhaustive. Future
research should address such hypotheses in greater depth.
Most importantly, the results of this paper suggest that anyone studying the e↵ect of oil
on political conflict should take the location of oil depletion into account. Moreover, it is
also possible that the spatial heterogeneity of oil extraction matters also for other types
of institutional and economic outcomes. Further research should attempt to explore this.
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7 Appendix
Table A4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Total oil production 21.06 122.378 8476
Onshore oil production 15.606 107.222 8616
O↵shore oil production 4.943 33.17 8910
Coup(Powell and Thyne) 0.053 0.261 8517
Coup(Marshall and Marshall) 0.056 0.276 12855
Log of GDP 0.079 0.011 9488
Economic growth 0.019 0.064 9341
Log of population 0.088 0.016 10441
Democracy 0.005 0.004 8933
Crude oil price 43.237 33.369 17696
Oil discovery 0.142 3.395 7320
Ongoing civil war 0.041 0.198 15419
Military spending per capita 184.201 340.347 1990
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Figure A4: Onshore and o↵shore production series 1929-2012
(in thousand barrels per day)
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Table A5: Baseline regressions with robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
Onshore oil production -0.472 0.01⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤ 0.008⇤
(-1.79) (3.09) (3.11) (2.43)
O↵shore oil production -0.133 -0.013⇤ -0.01⇤⇤ -0.01⇤
(-0.39) (-2.49) (-2.76) (-2.60)
Log of GDP -205.9⇤ -110.61⇤ -73.75 -66.95⇤
(-2.34) (-3.47) (-1.80) (-2.49)
Economic growth -9.778⇤⇤⇤ -3.36⇤⇤⇤ -3.19⇤⇤ -2.68⇤⇤
(-4.54) (-3.34) (-2.93) (-3.06)
Log of population -381.7 -166.16 -313.65⇤⇤ -97.43⇤⇤⇤
(-0.73) (-1.92) (-2.99) (-3.85)
Democracy index -330.7⇤⇤⇤ -88.4⇤ 165.42⇤ -95.75⇤⇤
(-3.94) (-2.50) (2.47) (-2.78)
OnshoreXmilexpenditure 0.001⇤
(2.45)
OnshoreoilXDemocracy -1.60 -.67 -.67
(-.66) (-.28) (-.27)
O↵shoreoilXDemocracy 3.70 -7.75 3.65
(1.02) (1.96) (1.02)
Crude oil price 0.000
(.31)
Ongoing civil war .79⇤
(2.45)
Oil discovery -.46
(-1.33)
Constant 27.89 18.35⇤ 29.19 -7.56⇤⇤
(0.67) (2.17) (3.02)⇤⇤ (-3.35)
N 1668 6080 3259 4290
Countries 121 128 94 99
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A6: Estimation on Marshall and Marshall (2011) dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
Total oil production 0.0016
(1.20)
Onshore oil production 0.007⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤
(3.11) (3.19) (4.58)
O↵shore oil production -0.006 -0.009⇤ -0.01⇤
(-1.48) (-2.27) (-2.33)
Log of GDP -80.73⇤⇤ -85.01⇤⇤⇤ -106.37⇤⇤⇤ -104.15⇤⇤⇤
(-4.02) (-3.92) (-3.96) (-3.43)
Economic growth -2.18⇤⇤ -2.17⇤ -1.268 -0.541⇤⇤
(-2.31) (-2.33) (-1.38) (-0.67)
Log of population -78.69 -89.70 -154.54⇤ -229.34
(-1.48) (-1.64) (-2.11) (-1.85)
Democracy index -76.13⇤ -78.98⇤ -87.96⇤⇤ 114.12
(-2.34) (-2.41) (-2.58) (1.70)
Crude oil price 0.08⇤⇤ 0.113
(1.55) (1.53)
Ongoing civil war 0.655⇤ 0.54
(2.56) (1.86)
Oil discovery -1.01 -1.69⇤
(-1.44) (-2.07)
Constant 9.65 4.109⇤ 12.74⇤ 2.86
(1.81) (2.04) (2.41 ) (0.38)
N 6265 6265 4436 2500
Countries 128 128 99 74
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A7: First-di↵erences estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: d.No of coup attempts
d.Total oil production per capita 0.0000255
(0.16)
d.Onshore oil production per capita 0.0003⇤ 0.0004⇤ 0.0004⇤
(1.98) (2.01) (2.38)
d.O↵shore oil production per capita -0.0009⇤⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤⇤ -0.0014⇤⇤⇤
(-3.62) (-5.17) (-4.63)
d.Log of GDP -7.701 -7.826 -12.14 -10.55
(-0.77) (-0.78) (-0.91) (-0.69)
d.Economic growth -0.205⇤ -0.205⇤ -0.172 -0.185
(-2.27) (-2.28) (-1.59) (-1.57)
d.logpop M -24.28⇤ -25.47⇤ -40.21⇤ -54.15⇤
(-2.19) (-2.35) (-2.59) (-2.02)
d.Democracy index -54.83⇤⇤⇤ -54.86⇤⇤⇤ -53.27⇤⇤⇤ -53.86⇤⇤⇤
(-4.34) (-4.34) (-3.54) (-3.48)
d.Crude oil price 0.0003 -0.004
(0.88) (-0.65)
d.Ongoing civil war 0.133 0.133
(1.53) (1.51)
d.Oil discovery -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤
(-26.39) (-18.75)
Constant 0.007⇤ 0.008⇤ 0.011⇤ 0.056
(2.09) (2.20) (2.54) (1.93)
N 5945 5945 4186 4186
Countries 128 128 99 99
FE No No No C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A8: Fixed e↵ects logistic regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
Total oil production 0.00184
(1.69)
Onshore oil production 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.009⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤
(4.31) (3.76) (3.34)
O↵shore oil production -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.017⇤⇤⇤
(3.80) (3.28) (-3.78)
Log of GDP -80.27⇤⇤ -126.74⇤⇤ -118.19⇤⇤ -84.83⇤
(-2.80) (-3.23) (-3.12) (-1.96)
Economic growth -4.346⇤⇤⇤ -4.009⇤⇤⇤ -3.20⇤⇤ -3.08⇤
(-3.84) (-3.34) (-2.82) (-2.31)
Log of population -102.6⇤⇤⇤ -249.52⇤⇤ -288.92⇤⇤ -503.62⇤⇤⇤
(-4.67) (-2.75) (-2.56) (-3.54)
democracy -106.7⇤⇤ -109.42⇤⇤ -121.55⇤⇤ 200.81⇤
(-3.06) (-2.89) (-3.25) (2.32)
Crude oil price 0.165⇤ 0.278⇤⇤
(2.22) (3.29)
Ongoing civil war 0.776⇤ 0.59
(2.06) (1.37)
Oil discovery -0.814⇤ -1.33⇤
(-2.30) (-2.09)
Constant 12.81⇤⇤⇤ 26.9⇤⇤ 23.819⇤⇤ 35.58⇤⇤
(5.21) (5.31) (2.81) (3.56)
N 3569 3569 2566 1708
Countries 128 128 56 55
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A9: Negative binomial fixed e↵ects on coup sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
Total oil production 0.00152
(1.03)
Onshore oil production 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤
(6.82) (5.72) (5.22)
O↵shore oil production -0.009⇤⇤ -0.008⇤⇤ -0.01⇤⇤
(-3.04) (-3.01) (-2.91)
Log of GDP -99.87⇤⇤ -109.8⇤⇤⇤ -88.78⇤⇤ -76.23⇤
(-3.15) (-3.40) (-2.90) (-2.09)
Economic growth -3.459⇤⇤ -3.406⇤⇤ -2.610⇤⇤ -1.980
(-3.18) (-3.24) (-2.71) (-1.87)
Log of population -132.2 -172.0 -177.3 -355.1⇤
(-1.47) (-1.92) (-1.83) (-2.52)
Democracy index -89.57⇤⇤ -94.28⇤⇤ -105.8⇤⇤⇤ 251.9⇤⇤
(-2.67) (-2.78) (-3.32) (3.07)
Crude oil price 0.108 0.192⇤
(1.78) (2.51)
Ongoing civil war 0.844⇤⇤ 0.619
(2.75) (-2.78)
Oil discovery -0.413 -1.278⇤
(-1.35) (-1.98)
Constant 14.59 18.80⇤ -2.67 7.14
(1.68) (2.17) (-0.40) (0.81)
N 3689 3689 2721 1741
Countries 101 101 80 64
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A10: Negative binomial, all variables in five-year changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
5 Y Total oil production 0.00692⇤⇤⇤
(3.53)
5 Y onshore oil production 0.007⇤ 0.007⇤ 0.007⇤
(2.41) (2.41) (2.42)
5 Y o↵shore oil production 0.004 0.004 0.005
(1.38) (1.38) (1.12)
5 Y log GDP -132.6⇤⇤⇤ -132.8⇤⇤⇤ -132.8⇤⇤⇤ -116.34⇤⇤
(-3.51) (-3.51) (-3.51) (-3.00)
5 Y economic growth -1.152 -1.153 -0.97 -1.153
(-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.28) (-1.72)
5 Y log population 547.8⇤⇤ 541.5⇤⇤ 500.03⇤ 541.5⇤⇤
(3.08) (3.01) (3.01) (2.50)
5 Y democracy index 18.13 17.93 -4.72 17.93
(0.47) (0.47) (-0.11) (0.47)
5 Y Crude oil price 0.005⇤ 17.93
(2.43) (0.47)
5 Y Ongoing civil war 0.213 17.93
(0.64) (0.47)
5 Y Oil discovery 0.045 17.93
(0.5) (0.47)
Constant -3.3⇤⇤⇤ -3.3⇤⇤⇤ -3.21⇤⇤⇤ -3.3⇤⇤⇤
(-13.19) (-13.09) (-10.84) (-13.09)
N 5505 5505 3960 5505
Countries 101 101 99 64
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A11: Negative binomial regression, excluding all extreme countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
Total oil production 0.00126
(0.83)
Onshore oil production 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤
(7.76) (7.76) (5.65)
O↵shore oil production -0.01⇤⇤ -0.087⇤⇤ -0.01⇤⇤
(-3.03) (-3.03) (-2.85)
Log of GDP -104.5⇤⇤ -116.9⇤⇤⇤ -110.26⇤⇤⇤ -85.44⇤
(-3.29) (-3.64) (-3.64) (-2.48)
Economic growth -3.112⇤⇤⇤ -3.028⇤⇤⇤ -2.44 ⇤⇤ -2.33⇤
(-3.40) (-3.45) (-2.88) (-2.32)
Log of population -143.8 -179.5 -179.5 -360.91⇤⇤
(-1.52) (-1.93) (-1.93) (-2.72)
Democracy index -80.80⇤ -83.92⇤ -197.57 165⇤
(-2.38) (-2.47) (-1.71) (-2.47)
Crude oil price 0.705 -83.92⇤
(.) (-2.47)
Ongoing civil war 0.485 -83.92⇤
(1.65) (-2.47)
Oil discovery -1.13 -83.92⇤
(-1.73) (-2.47)
Constant -19.78⇤⇤⇤ -16.72⇤⇤ -31.49⇤⇤⇤ -16.72⇤⇤
(-4.11) (-2.88) (-11.54) (-2.82)
N 5763 5763 4038 2255
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table A12: Estimation of model 1, but with lagged oil production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var: No of coup attempts
Lagged total oil production 0.00
(0.47)
Lagged onshore oil production 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤ 0.0063⇤⇤
(4.11) (3.39) (2.93)
Lagged o↵shore oil production -0.009⇤⇤ -0.01⇤⇤ -0.013⇤⇤⇤
(-3.27) (-3.14) (-3.67 )
log of GDP -97.44⇤⇤ -106.85⇤⇤ -82.26⇤⇤ -60.25
(-3.01) (-3.26) (-2.69) (-1.78)
Economic growth -3.47⇤⇤ -3.32⇤⇤ -2.49⇤⇤ -2.12⇤
(-3.26) (-3.11) (-2.60) (-1.96)
log of population -150.12 -184.76⇤ -217.96⇤ -375.22⇤⇤
(-1.82) (-2.29) (-2.38) (-3.06)
Democracy index -86.43⇤ -90.64⇤⇤ -100.74⇤⇤ 138.28⇤
(-2.59) (-2.68) (-3.19) (2.19)
Crude oil price .074 .15⇤
(1.41) (2.45)
Ongoing civil war .86⇤⇤ 0.73⇤
(2.90) (2.12)
Oil discovery -.29 -1.12
(-.88) (-1.84)
Lag of No of Coup attempts .28 ⇤⇤ .21
(3.39) (1.81)
Constant 16.07⇤ 19.77⇤ -.058 8.44
(1.98) (2.47) (-.01) (1.10)
N 6079 6079 4209 2390
Countries 128 128 99 74
FE C/Y C/Y C/Y C/Y
t statistics in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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